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The granting of territorial autonomy in the Balkans means
that large scale violence is now near-impossible. But small
scale conflicts continue.
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Since the conflicts of the 1990s, various regions within the Balkans have been granted
territorial autonomy in order to avoid further violence. Soeren Keil assesses the strategy,
finding a great deal of variety in the implementation and effectiveness of territorial autonomy
and power sharing across the region. While in most cases the likelihood of violent conflict is
now very small, secessionist movements have been encouraged and functional states have
not been created.
Territorial autonomy and local self -government has become one of  the key strategies f or
conf lict management in ethnically divided societies. From Ethiopia to Af ghanistan, and f rom Belgium to
Iraq, territorial decentralisation has been used to ensure that dif f erent ethnic groups are able to rule
over their own af f airs and enjoy a high degree of  autonomy, while power-sharing has been implemented
simultaneously in central institutions to guarantee decision-making by consensus.
No region has seen more variety in the implementation of  territorial autonomy mixed with power-sharing
institutions than countries in Southeastern Europe. Territorial autonomy varies greatly in the region, f rom
literally no self -government f or minorit ies in Croatia to a high degree of  decentralisation in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. While some countries have implemented territorial autonomy as a strategy of  peace-
building (such as Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo), others use it to avoid conf lict in the f irst place (such
as Serbia in the autonomous province of  Vojvodina). Ongoing debates about constitutional ref orms in
Bosnia, new demands f or territorial autonomy through f ederalism among the Albanians in Macedonia and
the problematic situation in Northern Kosovo demonstrate that territorial autonomy remains a contested
concept.
Bosnian Serbs continuously point out that their existence in Bosnia is only protected through the high
level of  autonomy that was granted to their entity in the Dayton Peace Agreement and that any f urther
centralisation would result in a danger that their group might be dominated by Bosniaks. The arguments
of  Bosnian Croats f or a third entity are very similar; they protest that the Federation of  Bosnia and
Herzegovina, which they “share” with the Bosniaks in f act disadvantages them and they theref ore require
their own territorial unit with the same level of  autonomy as the Republika Srpska and the Federation.
In Macedonia, Albanians are becoming more and more f rustrated with the ethnic Macedonian elite,
because of  the continued discussion on the name of  the country with Greece, which has resulted in a
Greek veto to Macedonia’s entry into NATO and to the start of  membership negotiations with the
European Union (EU). Albanians f eel that their concerns are not taken into account and that they are
taken hostage by an increasingly nationalist government in Skopje. While the Ohrid Framework
Agreement, that ended the violent insurgency in Macedonia in 2001, stated in Article 1.2 that “there are no
territorial solutions to ethnic conf lict,”Macedonia has nevertheless implemented a high degree of
decentralisation. Nevertheless, new tensions among Albanians and Macedonians have resulted in
Albanian demands f or a complete f ederalisation of  the country.
Finally, Northern Kosovo remains the most volatile area in the Western Balkans and conf lict between
local Serbs and Kosovo security f orces can erupt at any time. All territory north of  the Ibar river remains
controlled by local Serbs and out of  reach f or the government in Priština. Discussions about the re-
integration of  Northern Kosovo into Serbia are ignored by the Kosovo government, but it is generally
clear that whatever solution will be f ound must involve a high degree of  territorial autonomy f or Northern
Kosovo.
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Southeastern Europe is
a good example that
demonstrates the
strengths and
weaknesses of  territorial
autonomy in ethnically
divided societies. While
autonomy is generally
seen as a tool to protect
minorit ies and their
language and culture, by
providing them with f ar-
reaching decision-making
competences in their
territorial unit(s), it can
also serve as a f irst step
towards independence,
equipping dif f erent
ethnic groups with the
institutions and
resources to push f or
eventual secession. The
success of
decentralisation in Macedonia and Southern Kosovo can be contrasted with the f ailure of  similar
arrangements in Bosnia and Northern Kosovo.
We should not be too crit ical with these arrangements and their results. It is important to note that
territorial autonomy as a tool of  conf lict management was used mainly by external actors in the three
cases discussed above. Bosnia’s Constitution was written by the US State Department and the
modif ication of  its complex f ederal system has been the result of  high level international intervention,
through the Of f ice of  the High Representative. Kosovo’s f irst Constitutional Framework was written by
UN lawyers and its current Constitution is heavily based on the Comprehensive Status Settlement
presented by Martt i Ahtisaari, the f ormer Finish President in 2007. American and European lawyers and
polit icians also played a key role in the negotiations that led to the Ohrid Framework Agreement in
Macedonia. The three cases are theref ore good examples of  “International Intervention and
Statebuilding” and territorial autonomy was a key strategy by international actors to bring an end to the
conf licts and ensure the restoration of  peace. Moreover, territorial autonomy was seen in all three cases
as a tool of  state building to ensure the continued existence of  the three states within their borders and
to ensure that decisions could be reached by consensus where required and otherwise give autonomy to
the dif f erent ethnic groups.
Are there any lessons to be learned f rom looking at Southeastern Europe? Some learning among local
and international actors seems to have taken place, because the degree of  territorial autonomy is very
dif f erent between Bosnia (a f ully f ederal system), Macedonia (limited decentralisation) and Kosovo (high
level of  decentralisation but no f ederal system). Some of  the problematic elements implemented in
Bosnia, such as the high level of  f inancial independence of  the territorial sub-units, have not been
implemented in Kosovo and Macedonia. The degree of  autonomy has also changed so that attempts of
secession are very unlikely in Macedonia and Southern Kosovo. However, the developments in Bosnia
and Northern Kosovo demonstrate the main f law of  all power-sharing and territorial autonomy
agreements in the three states. Fundamentally, these three countries remain internally and externally
challenged. Bosnia’s Serbs regularly threaten a ref erendum on secession, Northern Kosovo is de f acto
independent f rom the rest of  the country and the Albanians in Macedonia also question the existence of
the state and their role in it. Furthermore, Bosnia remains challenged by Serbia, which continuously
supports radical Bosnian Serb policies that undermine the Bosnian state. The name dispute with Greece
undermines Macedonia’s international standing and Serbia continues to work hard to avoid the
recognition of  Kosovo by other countries.
For territorial autonomy, the glass is half -empty rather than half - f ull. While large-scale violence has
become near- impossible in the region, smaller conf licts will continue to occur. While the arrangements f or
territorial autonomy have contributed to some transf ormation of  the conf licts into polit ical
disagreements rather than violent conf licts, they have however f ailed in establishing f unctional and
saturated states. This is also a f ailure f or those international actors involved in statebuilding and
conf lict management in the Western Balkans.
More on Bosnia’s complex federal system is forthcoming in: Keil, Soeren: Multinational Federalism in Bosnia
and Herzegovina (London: Ashgate, f orthcoming 2013).
This article is based on Soeren Keil LSEE lecture “Territorial autonomy as a
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here for more details and to listen to a podcast of the event.
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